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NASA IV&V Program 
NPR 7150.2, NASA Software Engineering Requirements 
The program manager shall ensure that software IV&V is performed 
on the following categories of projects: 
– Category 1 
– Category 2 that have Class A or Class B payload risk 
classification 
– Projects specifically selected by NASA Chief of Safety and 
Mission Assurance 
 
IV&V = Independent Verification and Validation [of Software] 
Independence: 
– Technical Independence 
– Managerial Independence 
– Financial Independence 
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NPR 7120.5E defines Categories; NPR 8705.4 defines classification of payload risk 
IV&V Methodology 
Criticality analysis assesses likelihood and 
impact of failed behaviors 
• Plotted on a risk matrix 
• Establish priorities and focus for analysis 
• Generally, FM is high criticality 
 
The goal of each IV&V project is to assure 
mission success by assuring that the 
critical software (mission-critical and/or 
safety-critical): 
• Does what it is supposed to do 
• Does not do what it is not supposed to do 
• Performs appropriately under adverse 
conditions 
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IV&V assures mission success by validating and verifying critical software 
IV&V Assurance Strategy 
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Challenges with Fault Management 
• Increasing FM complexity goes beyond traditional fault protection 
with the goal of not only averting catastrophe, but also maintaining 
capability 
 
• FM systems, many times architected as reactive components 
embedded within the overall software system, must be validated 
against higher-level system capability requirements 
 
• Off-nominal conditions are challenging to identify comprehensively, 
understand completely, and ascertain the optimal response to 
mitigate risk 
 
• Existing software development and assurance practices applied to 
FM systems need improvement to provide a high level of assurance 
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FM Architectures Encore Initiative 
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Adverse Conditions 
• Examining Q2 and Q3 are major 
challenges of FM software 
• Adverse Condition: A subset of 
an off-nominal state that 
prevents a return to nominal 
operations and compromises 
mission success unless an 
effective response to the causal 
fault is employed. 
• How a system is architected to 
handle faults and adverse 
conditions is crucial for the 
satisfaction of functional and 
performance requirements for 
mission success 
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Adverse Condition Database 
• Create a database that centralizes a compilation of adverse 
conditions and related data from NASA projects 
• Architect the fields such that there may be sharing of data between 
projects and among the broader software assurance community for 
more rigorous analysis  
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Survey Methodology 
IV&V Analyst Subject Matter Experts were surveyed from each of nine chosen 
projects with a variety of mission types, developers, and relative complexity 
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Name Mission Type 
Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) Deep Space Robotic 
International Space Station (ISS) Manned Spaceflight 
James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) Deep Space Robotic 
Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Manned Spaceflight 
Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) Earth Orbiter 
Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS) Earth Orbiter 
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite R-Series (GOES-R) Earth Orbiter 
Solar Probe Plus (SPP) Deep Space Robotic 
Space Launch System (SLS) Launch Vehicle 
Architecture Matrix TR (excerpt) 
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Survey Question Cross-Mission Observations 
Structure - How is it structured/organized? 
Is the FM architecture fully local?  System?  
Hybrid?  Some other organization? 
A tradeoff exists between the simplicity of a centralized system level approach, and the robustness of a hybrid, tiered approach.  The lower 
the level at which the fault can be handled, the less impact it has on the system.  Earth Orbiters tend to be more centralized, Human-rated 
vehicles more distributed, and Deep Space falling anywhere along the scale depending on the mission parameters and developer. 
How many tiers/layers are there in the FM 
architecture?  Do these tiers/layers overlap? 
Tiers are used to organize systems that are not centralized, but even the most centralized examples here still have hardware layer FM.  
Often there are two tiers:  local and system.  Sometimes FM is just primarily system level (with some additional hardware layer FP), and 
sometimes one or more intermediate tiers are used in between local and system, depending on the complexity of the spacecraft 
architecture.  Usually these tiers have to overlap the same faults to allow them to be handed up from a lower tier to a higher one, but this 
is always done in a systematic, logical way. 
Concept - What are the big design ideas? 
Is the system fully automated?  Does it allow for 
human intervention?  Is it designed with humans 
in the loop? 
Timing often requires high autonomy, either because human reaction time is too slow, or because of communication delays.  Most Earth-
Orbiting and Deep Space missions are not designed around having human controllers constantly watching, and some don't even dictate 
regular contact, but ground ops is always given the capability to perform FM procedures.  Degree of autonomy appears to correlate loosely 
with distance from operators (onboard or on the ground). 
What was the process used to develop the FM 
architecture and system? 
Developers tend to fall back on what they know and have experience in - heritage programs, prior life cycle processes, even ones that are 
of different mission domains.  Human-rated missions require a slightly different approach, however, and may require a more unique 
process. 
Implementation - How was it built, how does it work? 
At what stage of the mission life cycle was the 
FM system designed and built? 
More and more, FM design is happening sooner, more in phase with the rest of the spacecraft systems, guided by heritage and previously-
developed standardized architectures, but it still has the potential to lag behind, especially to adapt to changes in other subsystems. 
How many fault monitors and unique responses 
does the system have? 
The more requirements the FM system has for preserving functionality when something goes wrong, the more monitors and response 
logic it is going to need to do its job.  Generally a system will have more monitors than responses, since different monitors or faults will 
trigger the same response. 
Other Architecture-Related Questions 
Is this FM architecture inherited from another 
mission or based on a previously-developed 
standardized architecture? 
All projects have some degree of inheritance, in the actual architecture and design or development process.  Developers often draw from 
their accumulated knowledge of what does and does not work in FM architecture development. 
How did the mission domain and parameters 
influence the design of the FM architecture? 
Critical mission events and other significant mission parameters like autonomy, onboard crew, and failure tolerance are often the largest 
drivers for structural and functional FM architecture design. 
Centralized FM Architectures 
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Functional Architecture Structural Architecture 
Centralized architectures are common in Earth Orbiters 
Hybrid FM Architectures 
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Functional Architecture 
Human Spacecraft and Deep Space Robotic missions commonly use 
 hybrid architectures 
Hybrid FM Architectures (continued) 
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Structural Architecture 
Visibility Matrix TR (excerpt) 
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Lifecycle Phase Development Artifact Architectural Visibility Analyst Visibility 
Concept 
  
  
  
Fault Management Plan When planned for and designed early in the lifecycle, FM 
architectures are generally more well-developed and 
documented, and therefore more visible, as opposed to 
architectures designed more as an afterthought. 
Comprehensive knowledge of the development process may provide context for 
architectural decisions and thereby increase visibility. 
A top-down design approach may lead to higher visibility, simply due to the flow 
of designs and documentation. 
Requirements Functional Requirements 
Specifications (L5/L6), 
Interface Control 
Documents, 
Interface Requirements 
Specs 
Requirements specify how software limits are employed to 
detect and guard against failure and recover from 
anomalous events and conditions. 
Missing and low-quality requirements or lack of traceability 
impede visibility. 
Requirements for Fault Management Detection, Correction and Responsive 
behaviors are not always explicitly indicated. 
Requirements decomposition leads to multiple levels of abstractions. Establishing 
appropriate Fault Management details for each level is necessary. 
Requirement specifications serve as a further description of the architecture and 
hierarchy of the FM system, and how it is intended to operate. 
Design 
  
  
Physical and Functional 
FM Diagrams 
Monitors are usually arranged and organized logically in the 
physical and functional system structures. 
A large number of dependencies can increase complexity 
and decrease visibility. 
If a system handles certain faults in different ways, it adds 
an additional layer of complexity that can challenge 
understanding. 
The relationships and interfaces of FM systems are usually well-documented and 
understood by analysts. 
Instances where faults are handled differently are primarily hardware faults that 
trigger basic responses like redundant component swaps.  These cases are usually 
documented in subsystem documents, but may be left out of system-level 
monitor/response lists because they happen on a low level, perhaps not even 
extending out of the hardware layer. 
An understanding of the physical components of the system is necessary in order 
to gauge whether appropriate monitors are defined. 
Implementation 
  
Source Code More source code generally increases the complexity of the 
system.  Factors affecting complexity include multitasking, 
inter-process communication, amount of auto-coding (and 
source of auto-coding), reuse, COTS. 
Solid designs and well-written requirements enable code visibility.  Language and 
code structures used can also impact the understandability of the software 
without clear supporting documentation.  Complexity with items like 
multitasking or complex inter-module communications complicate code visibility, 
even when strong requirements and designs exist. 
Test 
  
  
Test Cases N/A Review of test plans may afford analysts additional insight into the types of 
testing that may be expected once test products are released.  Single-tier testing 
vs. multi-tier testing, testing with simulations vs. testing with real hardware, etc. 
Assurance Strategy TR (excerpt) 
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Typical Assurance Objectives or Conclusions Source Mission 
Type 
3Qs 
Mapping 
Integration & Testing Phase 
"There are no inadvertent fatal Event Records in the code that could cause an unplanned 
processor reset."  
Deep Space Robotic Q2 
"The Second Chance Entry, Descent, & Landing does not harm the core Entry, Descent, & 
Landing sequence." 
Deep Space Robotic Q2 
"The analyzed fault management implementation has been proven correct and complete 
through verification testing." 
Earth Orbiter Q1 
"All necessary fault paths were exercised in the identified validation testing." Human Spaceflight Q1 
"The set of tests was comprehensive with regard to the Fault Management Design Document 
algorithms." 
Human Spaceflight Q1 
"The FM data input parameters, persistence limits, CUI’s, etc., were validated through 
appropriate testing." 
Human Spaceflight Q1 
"The in-scope software will perform its intended functions for nominal [and addressed off-
nominal] conditions at a higher risk level than a human-rated mission." 
Human Spaceflight Q1 
Q3 
Conclusions 
 
• Developers’ previous experience and mission heritage have a large effect 
on the FM architecture used, sometimes independent of the mission domain 
 
• Analysts need to rely on their collective knowledge and experience to 
decide how best to build and execute an Assurance Strategy 
 
• Planning is not always enough, however; analysts must also be prepared to 
adapt to visibility challenges as they appear 
 
• The TR suite generated from this initiative builds a strong foundation to fill 
the existing gaps in the FM knowledge domain and is useful across the 
Agency and beyond 
 
• Building a culture or community that values cross-project communication for 
continual improvement needs to be a priority for FM architectural design 
and analysis  
 
• AC Database enhancements and investigation into how nontraditional 
processes (model-based FM within an Agile development) affect FM 
architectural design are aspects of SARP FMAE 
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